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Abstract.  Pollution is a  by-product of production, is only gradually dissolved by the environ- 
ment,  and  crosses  national  borders.  The  market  outcome  ignores  the  adverse  effects  of 
pollution and  thus  yields higher levels of output and pollution than would  prevail under a 
supranational social planner which does care about pollution. In practice, governments often 
do  not  cooperate  and  this leads  to  outcomes  of pollution and  production  in  between  the 
market outcomes and the outcomes under supra-national social planning. Absence of precom- 
rnitment  leads  to  lower  emission  charges,  less  cleaning-up  activities  and  more  pollution. 
Appropriate  levels  of  emission  charges  under  the  various  outcomes  are  a  result  of  this 
analysis.  Attention  is  also  paid  to  investment  in  clean  technology.  The  debate  between 
optimists, who believe that higher production is compatible with sound environmental policy, 
and pessimists can be analysed in this way. 
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I.  Introduction 
Pollution is an inevitable by-product of production and damages the environ- 
ment. Pollution also traverses national borders  and is  therefore an interna- 
tional  problem.  Market  outcomes  are  efficient when  all  agents  are  price 
takers  and when a  complete set of contingent markets exists for each and 
every commodity (e.g., Malinvaud, 1972),  but the absence of private prop- 
erty  rights  for  a  clean  environment and  associated  markets  for  pollution 
rights imply that market outcomes will be inefficient and there will  be too 
much  production  and  pollution  (e.g.,  Dasgupta,  1982).  Three  main  ap- 
proaches to environmental policy can be distinguished. The first is to enforce 
property rights with binding quota restrictions on the amount produced. The 
problems with such emission standards are that they are difficult to enforce, 
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that they are associated with high administrative  costs, and that they lead to 
economic inefficiencies. The  second approach is  to rely on Pigouvian taxes 
and subsidies. Such emission charges correspond to the social price of a unit 
of pollution and  thus  ensure that polluters  pay for the damage they impose 
on  the  environment  and  that  the  non-cooperative  market  outcome is  effi- 
cient. The final approach is to explicitly fill in the missing markets by intro- 
ducing markets for pollution rights. Here attention is mostly focussed on the 
second approach. 
This paper characterises and compares the optimal emission charges when 
each country sets its environmental policy in a non-cooperative manner and 
when all countries coordinate their actions and set their environmental policy 
jointly. It also discusses the potential  gains from the international  coordina- 
tion  of emission  charges. 1 The  benchmark  corresponds  to  a  decentralised 
market  outcome,  which  is  relevant  when  none  of  the  countries  pursues 
environmental  policies.  Section  2  starts  with  a  simple  static  multi-country 
model with flow damage of pollution. International  policy coordination leads 
to higher emission charges and consequently lower levels of production. The 
remainder of the paper deals with the intricacies  of differential game theory 
which arise when one considers the stock damage of environmental pollution. 
Section 3  sets up the model. Section 4  discusses the outcome under interna- 
tional  coordination  of emission charges.  Sections  5  and  6  discuss the non- 
cooperative  emission  charges  associated  with,  respectively,  the  open-loop 
Nash  and  the  subgame-peffect (or  feedback) Nash  equilibrium.  The  open- 
loop Nash equilibrium leads to lower levels of production and pollutants and 
to higher emission charges than the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, and is 
therefore  closer  to  the  outcome  under  intemational  policy  coordination. 
However, because the open-loop solution concept is less realistic, this in fact 
means  that  the  open-loop  Nash  equilibrium  seriously  underestimates  the 
damage  to the environment  of not  coordinating  emission charges,  and  thus 
underestimates  the  potential  benefits  of international  policy  coordination. 
Section 7  discusses the potential benefits of efforts to clean up the environ- 
ment and finds that cleaning-up  activities do not occur if matters  are left to 
the market and are highest under international policy coordination. Also, the 
open-loop Nash equilibrium  overestimates the level of cleaning-up  activities 
compared  with  the  subgame-peffect Nash  equilibrium.  Section  8  discusses 
investment  in  clean  technology  and  reducing  the  stock  of  pollutants  and 
relates this to the environmental  debate between optimists, who believe that 
higher  production  benefits  a  sound  environmental  policy,  and  pessimists, 
who believe that  national  production  should fall for otherwise the environ- 
ment will suffer irrepairable damage. Section 9 concludes the paper. 
2.  Flow Damage of  Pollution 
There are N  countries denoted with the subscripts i ---- 1  .....  N. There is no International  Aspects of  Pollution Control  119 
investment in physical capital, so what each country produces is consumed. 2 
The net social benefits of production of country i, say Y,, are given by B(Y/), 
B"  <  0.  Net benefits initially  increase with the level of production  as this 
means a  higher  level of consumption, but at high levels of consumption the 
marginal  utility  of consumption  is  much  lower than  the  marginal  utility  of 
leasure  so  that  net  benefits  decrease  with  the  level  of production.  In  the 
decentralised  market  outcome  agents  hardly  care  about  the  environment, 
because  their  individual  actions  have  little  effect  on  total  pollution.  It  is 
therefore  assumed  that  the  market  outcome  corresponds  to  Y,  =  YM  -- 
arg(maxr B(Y)) and satisfies B'(YM) ---- 0. This is, of course, a simplified view 
of  the  world  (see,  for  a  more  comprehensive  discussion  of  these  issues, 
Folmer and van Ierland, 1989). 
However, pollution is an inevitable by-product of production,  a Y/, where 
a  >  0  denotes  the  emission-output  ratio.  The  emission-output  ratio  is 
assumed  to  be constant;  Section  7  discusses what happens  when it can  be 
reduced  by  investment  in  new  technology.  Pollution  affects  all  countries 
immediately and, for the time being, it is assumed that the flow of pollution 
F  -  (a/N)  (Z/N_iV/), affects  social  welfare  directly.  To  be  precise,  D(F), 
D'  >  0,  D"  >f  0,  denotes  the  social  damage  caused  by the  emission  of 
pollutants  by all  of the  countries  concerned.  The  marginal  social  damage 
increases with the level of pollution. The definition of the flow of pollution, 
F, makes the analysis symmetric. Asymmetries such as "downstream" pollu- 
tion  are  dealt with in  the  Appendix  for the  more interesting  case of stock 
damage, which is the subject of the next section. An example of pollution that 
is detrimental to welfare as a flow is noise, although this does not seem very 
relevant in an international context. 
When the governments engage in pollution control, two outcomes should 
be distinguished.  The  first is  the non-cooperative Nash--Cournot  outcome 
(denoted by the subscript N) in which each government chooses its level of 
production to maximise  social welfare, B(Y,) -  D(F), taking the actions of 
the  other  governments  as  given,  Each  government  then  sets  the  marginal 
benefits  of  an  additional  unit  of  production  equal  to  its  marginal  social 
damage. Symmetry yields: 
B'( YN) = (a/N)D'(a YN).  (2.1) 
The  second  outcome prevails  under  international  policy coordination  (de- 
noted  by the  subscript  /),  which  is  relevant  when  each  government  inter- 
nalises the adverse effects of higher production and pollution on the welfare 
of the other countries. Symmetry yields: 
B'( Y1) =  aD'(aYi).  (2.2) 
Figure  1 compares the various outcomes. It is clear that  leaving matters  to 
the  market  leads  to  the  highest  level  of production  and  pollution,  whilst 
international  coordination  of emission  charges  leads  to  the  lowest level of 120  F. van der Ploeg  and A. J. de Zeeuw 
production and pollution. The optimal emission charges per unit of pollution, 
P(Y,) =  (a/N)Y,,  are  r N =  D'(aYN) and  T1 =  N  D'(aYI),  respectively, and 
the  revenues  from  these  levies  are  redistributed  in  a  lump-fashion.  The 
market  then  sustains  the  social  optimal  outcomes, because when individual 
agents maximise B(Y/) -  TNP(Y,) or B(Y,) --  z1P(Y/) the economy ends up 
with  Y, --  YN or  Y, =  Yt, respectively. The main results can be summarised 
by  Yl  <  YN  <  YM and  r 1 >  r N  >  r M -=  0. Failing to coordinate emission 
charges leads to too much pollution. 
B'(Y)  -otD'(otY) 
Fv)O'( Yl 
Y~  YN  Y. 
Fig. 1.  International coordination of environmental  policies with flow damage of pollution. 
3.  Stock Damage of Pollution  3 
The main thrust of the present paper is concerned with the stock rather than 
the flow damage of pollution. Assume therefore that the concentration level 
of pollutants in the environment changes over time according to: 
,~=(a/N)  (  ~,-1Y,)--6S,  S(O)=So,  (3.1) 
where  6  t>  0  denotes the  depreciation rate of the pollution concentration. 
Some pollutants (e.g., pesticides like DDT) are degraded at a  very slow rate, 
others (e.g., herbicides) at a  much faster rate. Ecologists warn of the danger 
that, when the concentration level becomes too large, pollutants become non- 
degradable,  but  here  attention is  focussed  on  a  constant  depreciation  rate. 
The concentration of the pollutant can also be decrased by cleaning up the 
environment, but this will not be discussed until Sections 7  and  8. The main 
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This is not unreasonable for pollution of the air (e.g., the stock of SO2 in the 
air).  In  general,  it  is  more  reasonable  to  assume  that  production  at  home 
pollutes  the environment  more  at  home  than  abroad,  but this  modification 
does not alter the qualitative nature of the steady-state results (see Appendix). 
The welfare function of government i is given by 
IVi -  I ~  exp(--rt)[B(Y~.(t))  -  D(S(t))] dt,  (3.2) 
J0 
where  r  denotes  the  social  rate  of discount  (or  the  consumption  rate  of 
interest) and D(S),  D'  >  O, D*  >1  O, denotes the social damage caused by a 
high concentration of pollutants. The damage can be direct (e.g., the effect of 
polluted  air  on  health)  or indirect  through  production  elsewhere  (e.g.,  the 
effect of polluted  air  on  laundry  companies  or on agricultural  enterprises). 
Some  pollutants  display  threshold  effects  (e.g.,  below  a  certain  level  of 
concentration  of smog trees  survive, but above this  level trees  do not  sur- 
five), but such non-convexities will not be considered. 
4.  ,International  Coordination of Emission Charges 
Under international  coordination  of environmental  policies denoted by the 
subscript  I,  the  countries  jointly  choose  {Yl(t)  ....  ,  YN(t),  t  >i  0},  to 
maximise  global welfare  W  -  (~~,N_IW/)  subject to  (3.1)--(3.2).  This  yields 
the following optimality conditions: 
B'(r1(t))=(a/N)r,(t),  t  >1 0  (4.1) 
ND'(SI(t)) -  ~vt(t  ) +  il(t  ) =  rrt(t),  t  >>- 0  (4.2) 
where  v  denotes  the  optimal  emission  charge.  The  shadow  price  of  the 
concentration  level  (the  co-state  variable  of the  optimal  control  problem), 
corresponds to the negative of the optimal emission charge, so v can also be 
interpreted as the marginal loss in welfare arising from a unit increase in the 
concentration  level  of the  pollutant.  Equation  (4.1)  says that  the  marginal 
benefit of production,  B'(Yt), should then equal the marginal damage arising 
from a higher  concentration  level of pollutants caused by an additional unit 
of production,  (a/N)r t.  The  concentration  level of the pollutant  is  a  stock 
with a negative social value, --v  I. In equilibrium the social rate of return on 
holding  this  "asset",  i.e.,  the  marginal  social  damage  for all  countries  con- 
cerned minus the rate of depreciation plus the expected capital loss on this 
asset,  should  equal  the  market  rate  of return  on  any  other  asset,  r.  This 
condition  corresponds to equation  (4.2). It is in principle no different from 
the arbitrage condition found in the theory of investment (which says that the 
marginal product of capital should equal the rental charge plus the deprecia- 
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negative  function  of  the  product  of  the  emission-output  ratio  and  the 
emission charge,  say  Y/=  ~(arl/N),  4"  =  1/B"  <  0,  so that  the develop- 
ment of the concentration level and the emission charge can be described by: 
Sl =  afk(ari/N)  -- 6S1,  $1(0) =  So  (4.3) 
~i =  (r +  6)~, -- ND'(SI).  (4.4) 
The  determinant  of  the  system  (4.3)--(4.4),  --  6(r  +  6)  +  a2D"~ ',  is 
negative, since S is predetermined and  31 is unconstrained by its past history. 
The phase diagram presented in Figure 2 confirms this saddlepoint property. 
It is clear that the concentration level of the pollutant and optimal emission 
charges  move up  and  down together.  An  environmental  disaster  causes an 
increase in the concentration level of the pollutant (a move from I to A). The 
governments immediately respond to the disaster together by increasing the 
emission  charges  (a  move  from  A  to  B).  The  private  sector  produces, 
consumes and thus pollutes less. Along the saddlepath, SS, the concentration 
level and emission charges diminish until everything is back to normal again 
(a move from B to I). It is obvious from Figure 2  that the market outcome, 
which prevails when there are no emission charges, leads to higher produc- 
tion  and  pollution  than  the  outcome  under  international  coordination  of 
emission charges. 
Obviously, when the governments jointly set an average emission charge 
of % per unit of pollution, say P(Y/) =  (a/N)Y,.,  i =  1 .....  N, private agents 
choose  Y/  to  maximise  B(Y/)  --  "~IP(Y~)  which  yields  (4.1)  and  thus  the 
market  is forced to behave in  a  socially optimal  way. The  revenues of the 
emission  charges  are  redistributed  in  a  lump-sum  fashion  and  everyone is 
better off. This is effectively the same as introducing the missing markets for 
pollution rights, because in an economy with perfect information the optimal 
emission  charges  should  correspond  to  the prices  pollution  rights  fetch on 
the open market. 
Y.  Y.  Y, 
,._] /~--0  S 
S t  S.  S  M  S 
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5.  Non-Cooperative Emission Charges: Open-Loop Information Sets 
Now consider the situation where individual governments set their environ- 
mental policy without taking into account the adverse effects of higher levels 
of production and consumption on the social welfare of other countries. An 
appropriate solution requires the use of differential game theory (e.g., Ba~ar 
and Olsder, 1982), which has previously been used in the theory of oligopoly 
extraction  of  a  common  renewable  property  resource  (e.g.,  Smith,  1968; 
Reinganum and Stokey, 1985; van der Ploeg, 1987). The first non-coopera- 
tive  solution  concept  considered  is  the  open-loop Nash  equilibrium  (indi- 
cated  by  the  subscript  N).  4 The  optimal  production  levels  and  emission 
charges of each country are conditioned on the initial concentration level of 
pollutants,  So, and time, and countries are supposed to stick to their policies. 
This  corresponds  to open-loop information  patterns  and  to infinite  periods 
of commitment  (cf.,  Reinganum  and  Stokey,  1985). Each country takes the 
environmental  policies  of the  other  countries  as  given. This  yields in  sym- 
metric equilibrium: 
SN-~ a(k(arN/N) -- 6SN,  aN(O)  =  So  (5.1) 
iN = (r+ 6)r  N -- D'(SN).  (5.2) 
The main difference arises from the marginal  social damage of an additional 
unit of production being only one N-th of that in the cooperative outcome. 
This means that in Figure 2 the slope of the  CN ---- 0 lOCUS is N  times smaller 
than  the  slope of the  fl ---- 0  locus,  so that  the non-cooperative open-loop 
Nash  equilibrium  has  in  the  steady  state  a  higher  concentration  level  of 
pollutants and a lower emission charge than the cooperative equilibrium. The 
reason  is  that,  in  the  absence  of  international  policy  coordination,  each 
country ignores the adverse effects on foreign social welfare of an additional 
unit  of production  and  pollution  and  therefore  produces  too much.  Non- 
cooperative  setting  of  emission  charges  is  of  course  better  than  leaving 
matters  to  the  market,  so  that  St(oo )  <  SN(r  <  SM(~ )  and  Vl(oo)  > 
>  =  o. 
For future reference, it is useful to give an explicit solution for the case 
that  the  net  social  benefits  function  and  the  social  damage  function  are 
quadratic, say B( Y) = flY-  ￿89  y2 and B( S) = ￿89  yS2:5 
s,(  )  .  <  oo )  < 
a2~ 
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Note that, as the number of countries becomes larger, the non-cooperative 
open-loop  equilibrium values for the concentration level of pollutants and 
the levels of production converge to the market values, even though the non- 
cooperative emission charges converge to a finite number, 7afl/O(r  +  6). 
When the governments jointly set an emission charge of  r N per unit of 
pollution, private agents choose Y/to maximise B(Y/) -  zuP(Y/).  This is the 
Pigouvian tax  scheme for the  case  of open-loop information patterns  and 
infinite periods of commitment. Since the emission charges are lower than in 
the cooperative outcome, there is excessive pollution. 
6.  Non-Cooperative Emission Charges: Subgame-Perfect  Outcome 
The problem with the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution is that it relies on 
unrealistic information sets and an infinite period of commitment. It is much 
more  realistic  to  assume  that  countries  can  condition today's production 
decisions  on  today's  concentration  level  of  pollutants.  In  that  case,  the 
appropriate non-cooperative solution concept is the feedback Nash equilib- 
rium or the subgame-peffect (Markov) outcome (denoted by a  subscript F) 
which corresponds to a zero length of commitment (Ba~ar and Olsder, 1982; 
Reinganum and Stokey, 1985; van der Ploeg, 1987; Fershtman and Kamien, 
1987;  Reynolds,  1987;  Fershtman,  1989;  van  der  Ploeg  and  de  Zeeuw, 
1990).  The  solution  is  now  obtained  with  the  aid  of Bellman's  dynamic 
programming rather than Pontryagin's maximum principle. This ensures that 
if there  is  a  shock  leading to  a  deviation from the  equilibrium path,  the 
feedback rules for the levels of production are at later dates still optimal to 
carry out if called upon to do so. The policies of the open-loop Nash equilib- 
rium are rational to carry out if called upon to do so at a later date, only as 
long as there are no deviations from the equilibrium path. In other words, the 
open-loop Nash  equilibrium is  time-consistent but not subgame-perfect. In 
order to obtain analytical results, attention is focussed on the case of quad- 
ratic net social benefits and social damage functions. 
Let  V,(S, t)  denote the value function of country i, i.e.,  the equilibrium 
maximal value of the discounted stream of net social benefits minus social 
damage, from time t onwards. Then the Hamilton--Jacobi--Bellman equation 
for country i can be written as follows: 
rE(S,  t) -- [~ Vi(S, t)/~t] ~  max  ] flY, -- 
1  1 
t  7  Y'-7   's2 
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This yields 
Y,(  S, t) = ~(--( a / N) [O V~(  S, t)/OS]) 
= fl + (a/N) [i3 Vi(S  , t)/i3S].  (6.2) 
Upon postulating a functional form for the value function,  V/(S, t) ---- a0, - 
aliS -- ￿89  z, substituting this and (6.2) into (6.1), imposing symmetry and 
equating  coefficients  on  S  and  S 2,  one  obtains  the  following  differential 
equations: 
01=(r+f$)al--(afl)a2+a2  ( 2N-1  )  N2  0102  (6.3) 
02~(r + 2t$)a2 + a2  (-- 
2N--1  )  z 
N 2  02- Y.  (6.4) 
The  stationary  solution  for  a 1  and  a 2,  associated  with  a  concave  value 
function (a2i  >  0), is unstable, so that the transient solution for 01  and  02 
must always equal the stationary solution: 
(  ~  )) 
ol----  >  0  (6.5) 
r + 6 + aZ  2N--1 
N~  02 
--(r+26)+  (r+26) z+47a 2  2N--1  ~ 
02----  )  >  0.  (6.6) 
The optimal emission charges are 
r e =  -[0 V,(S, t)/OS] ---- 01 + o2S,  (6.7) 
so that the development of the concentration level of the pollutants is given by 
Equation (6.8) is stable and yields the steady-state outcome: 
SF(OO)~_ ( aft-  a2(ol/N)  ) 
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Comparing this outcome with the steady-state outcome for open-loop infor- 
mation  patterns  and  pre-commitment,  derived  in  Section  5,  the  following 
result is obtained. 
PROPOSITION  6.1.  St(oo  )  <  SN(oo  )  <  Sv(OO  )  <  SM(OO  )  and  v1(oo  )  > 
ru(~  >  v~(~176  >  VM =  0 hold. 
Proof.  The  first  inequalities  already  appeared  in  (5.3)  and  the  third 
inequalities  are,  given that  Ol,  0  2  >  O,  obvious. Consider now the  second 
inequality for the concentration levels of pollutants. Since 
aft -  a2(al/N)= aft 
r+6+a2  N--1  ) 
N~  o2 
(6.10) 
holds, one has using (5.3) and (6.9) to prove that, 
r +  6 +  a 2  2N-- 1  ~  (  a2  N-- 1 
(6.11) 
or 
ez.  (6.12) 
This last inequality is immediately clear from a2  >  0 and from the fact that 
the right-hand  side of (6.4) has to be zero, because then the left-hand side of 
(6.12)  is  zero  whilst  the  right-hand  side  of (6.12)  is  strictly  positive.  The 
second inequality for the optimal emission charges then follows immediately 
from ~'  <  0.  [] 
The open-loop Nash equilibrium underestimates the damage of not coordi- 
nating  emission  charges  for  the  environment,  because  the  feedback  Nash 
equilibrium  is  the  relevant  equilibrium  to  look  at  and  leads  to  greater 
pollution  of  the  environment  than  the  open-loop  Nash  equilibrium.  The 
appropriate non-cooperative equilibrium seems the subgame-perfect equilib- 
rium,  which  yields  more  pollution  than  the  open-loop  equilibrium  and  a 
fortiori  more  than  the  cooperative equilibrium  but  less  pollution  than  the 
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considering  to produce  a  marginal  amount  more causes  an increase  in  the 
concentration level of pollutants for all countries concerned. In the feedback 
Nash  equilibrium  this  country knows that  the  other  countries  will respond 
with somewhat higher emission charges, lower production levels and thus less 
pollution. This means that the marginal damage caused to the environment of 
an  additional  unit  of production  is  less than  it would be in the  open-loop 
Nash equilibrium, so that in equilibrium the incentive to have more produc- 
tion and pollution will be higher in the feedback Nash than in the open-loop 
Nash  equilibrium.  The  appropriate  Pigouvian  tax  scheme  for  this  case  of 
feedback information patterns and a zero length of commitment is to set an 
emission charge of rF per unit of pollution. Emission charges are lower than 
in the open-loop case, so there is more pollution. 
An  important  conclusion  is  thus  that  using  the  less  realistic  open-loop 
Nash  equilibrium  concept would lead one to underestimate  the  damage  to 
the  environment  of not coordinating  emission  charges  (SN(oo)  --  $i(oo )  < 
S~(oo)  -  Sz(oo)).  Clearly,  the  more  appropriate  use  of the  feedback Nash 
equilibrium  concept  strengthens  the  case for  international  coordination  of 
pollution control. 
7.  Efforts to Clean up the Environment 
Countries  can engage in efforts to clean up the environment.  This yields an 
additional  externality,  because  cleaning  up  rubbish  is  a  public  good  as  all 
countries  benefit from it.  The problem for the  government  of country  i  is 
then to choose {Y/(t), J,(t), t  >1  0}, where J,. denotes the efforts of country i 
in cleaning up the environment, in order to maximise its welfare function, 
W~=-f~exp(-rt)[B(Y,)-C(Jt)--D(S)]dt,  (7.1) 
where C(Ji), C'  >  O, C"  >  O, denotes a convex cost function, subject to the 
equation of the development of the concentration level of pollutants, 
The  market  outcome  is  unaffected,  because  private  agents  do  not  find  it 
optimal  to engage in abatement  activities. The outcome under international 
coordination of environmental policies yields, besides (4.1) and (4.2), 
C'(Jt(t)) ~  (1/N)~7(t)  (7.3) 
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the marginal social benefit of this activity. The development of the concentra- 
tion level of pollutants and the emission charge is thus described by: 
SI =  afh(arl/N)  -  6S1- V2(rl/N),  $1(0) = So  (7.4) 
and (4.4), where ~0' ~- I/C"  >  O. 
The  best outcome, i.e.,  the outcome under intemational  coordination  of 
environmental  policies  can  not  be  sustained  by the  market  alone,  i.e.,  by 
levying emission charges equal to  1:1, because at the same time governments 
must intervene  and  spend  resources in cleaning up the environment  to the 
level Jl. Alternatively, when individual governments levy an emission charge 
of ri  and give a  subsidy of (rx/N)  per unit of private investment in cleaning 
up the environment, the market is forced to behave in a socially optimal way. 
The reason is that when individual private agents in country i choose {  Y,, J,} 
to maximise net profits, B(Y,.) -  C(J,) -- rIP(Y,) +  (rt/N)Ji,  they behave in a 
way that leads to the same outcome as under international  policy coordina- 
tion. 
The non-cooperative (open-loop Nash) equilibrium is given by (5.2) and 
aN =  a~(arN/N)  -- 6SN-  IP(rN/N),  SN(O) =  So.  (7.5) 
The explicit steady-state solution for a quadratic net social benefits function, 
a quadratic social damage function and a quadratic cost function, say C(J) = 
￿89  0/z, leads to the following modification of (5.3): 
0 -]-  a2 +  0) 
a# 
SM(~176  ----  6  (7.6) 
where 0 denotes the cost-of-adjustment parameter. 
The feedback Nash equilibrium is given by (6.2), 
Ji(S, t)= ~0(--(1/N)[0 V,(S, t)/igS])=-  (1~NO)[0 V~(S, 0/0S]  (7.7) 
and (6.5)--(6.9) with a 2 replaced by (a 2 +  (1/0)). Proposition 6.1 still holds, 
so that Sl(OO)  <  SN(oo)  <  SF(oo)  <  SM(oo) and  vl(oo)  >  rN(m)  >  rF(~  ) 
>  V  M ---- 0. Furthermore, efforts to clean up the environment do not occur in 
the market outcome, are the lowest for the non-cooperative subgame-perfect 
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Jr(oo)  >  JM(oo)  "=  0).  This  follows  immediately  from  (7.3).  Hence,  the 
subgame-perfect outcome leads to less cleaning-up  activities than the open- 
loop  outcome.  Finally,  it  follows as  before that  the  level  of production  is 
highest in the market outcome and lowest under international  policy coordi- 
nation  and  the  open-loop  Nash  equilibrium  underestimates  the  level  of 
production and pollution and the potential gains from coordination (t'M(oo) 
>  V~(oo)>  yN(r  yt(oo)). 
The  possibility of cleaning  up the  environment,  even at  a  cost, leads  to 
lower  concentration  levels  of pollutants  for  the  cooperative  and  the  non- 
cooperative  outcomes,  which  is  not  very  surprising  of  course.  It  will  be 
interesting to analyse the trade-off between investment in cleaning up, invest- 
ment in clean technology and more production (see Section 8). 
8.  Investment in Clean Technology: Optimists versus Pessimists 
The previous section analysed the potential benefits of cleaning up the stock 
of pollutants. Although this describes an important feature of environmental 
problems  and  is  relatively  straightforward  to  analyse,  it  is  probably more 
satisfactory to assume that  cleaning activities affect the rate  at which pollu- 
tants  are dissolved and  to allow for investment in new, cleaner technology. 
These efforts will leave less resources available for private consumption. The 
disadvantage  of  this  more  realistic  approach  is  that  the  non-cooperative, 
subgame-perfect  outcome  is  difficult to  calculate.  Hence,  attention  will  be 
focussed on  comparing  the  market  outcome  (M)  with  the  outcome  under 
international  policy coordination  (/) and with the non-cooperative, precom- 
mitment outcome (N). The crucial question is whether one should side with 
the optimists or the pessimists in the environmental  debate.  6 The pessimists 
argue that  the only way to safe-guard the environment is to cut production, 
whilst  the  optimists  argue  that  the  best  policy  is  to  increase  production 
because then more resources are available for investment in clean technology 
and  improving  the rate  of degradation.  This  section attempts  to shed some 
light on this important policy issue. 
By investing in the stock of clean technology, say K, a country can reduce 
the  emission-output  ratio  a(K),  a"  <  O,  a"  >>-  O.  Clean  technology  is 
assumed  to  be  public  knowledge,  so  that  all  countries  benefit  from  the 
investment I i in clean technology of an individual country i: 
where p  t>  0 denotes the rate of depreciation of the common stock of clean 
technology. There are convex adjustment costs associated with investment in 
clean technology, say A(/,), A(O) =  A'(O) ---- 0, A"  >  O, where A(Ii) denotes 
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change  the  stock  of clean  technology. Individual  countries  can  also  spend 
effort, say J,,  on reducing the prevailing depreciation rate of the concentra- 
tion level of pollutants, so that instead of (3.1) one has: 
where 6'  >  0. There are diminishing returns to cleaning up the environment, 
so that  6"  <  O. Since the amount left over from total production for con- 
snmption  purposes  in  country  i  equals  Ci  -  (Y,  --  Ii  -  A(I,)  --  Ji),  the 
welfare function of country i can be written as 
W,  -  I] exp(-rO [B(Y~(t)- I,(t)--A(Ii(O)- 
-  J~(t)) -- D(S(t))]  dt  (8.3) 
instead of (7.1). The government of country i now chooses {  Y,(t),/,(t), J,(t), t 
>t 0} in order to maximise (8.3) subject to (8.1)--(8.2). 
8.1. INTERNATIONAL  POLICY COORDINATION 
The market outcome is the usual glum state of affairs: the level of production 
is  set  without  taking  into  account  environmental  considerations  and  no 
investment in clean technology or cleaning up the environment  takes place 
(Yi  ~-  YM,  I, ---- 0, J~ =  0). The outcome under international  coordination of 
environmental policies yields the first-order conditions: 
B'( Y  -- I  -- A(1) -- J) =  (a(K)/N)r  ---- O'(N J)Sr  (8.4) 
B'(Y  -- I  --A(1)  -- J) [1 + A'(/)] =  q.  (8.5) 
Equation (8.4) says that the social benefit of a marginal increase in consump- 
tion must equal the marginal  damage to the environment associated with the 
increase  in  production  and  must  also  equal  the  marginal  damage  to  the 
environment associated with the reduction in cleaning-up activities. Equation 
(8.5) says that the marginal benefits from one unit less of investment in clean 
technology should equal the shadowprice of clean technology, q. In addition, 
the user cost of the stock of clean technology (rental charge plus depreciation 
charge minus capital gains) must equal the marginal  benefit of an extra unit 
of capital stock required for cutting the emission-output ratio: 
[r +  p  -- (dl/q)]q  =  --ra'(K)  Y.  (8.6) 
Similarly,  the  user cost of the  stock of pollutants  must  equal the  marginal 
social damage: 
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In  order  to perform  the comparative  statics  of the  steady state,  it is for 
simplicity assumed that there are no cleaning-up  activities (Ji --  0) and that 
the stock of clean technology does not depreciate (p -- 0) so that from (8.1) 
the steady-state levels of investment in clean technology are zero (I,  =  0). It 
follows that  the levels of consumption equal the levels of production  (C  i -- 
Y,). Combining  the first equality of (8.4)  with (8.5)  and  the  steady state of 
(8.6), one obtains the following long-run relationship: 
a'(K)  /  K  (8.8) 
where  an  iso-elastic  function  for  the  relationship  between  the  emission- 
output ratio and the stock of clean technology has been assumed, i.e.,  a(K) 
-- a0  K-~  to  >  0. It is assumed that to  ~<  ￿89  holds. In other words, the levels 
of production and consumption are proportional to the stock of clean tech- 
nology. For a given stock of clean technology, the higher the efficiency of the 
stock of clean technology,  to, and the lower the rate of time preference, the 
lower the levels of consumption  and  production.  Combining  (8.2),  the first 
equality of (8.4) and (8.7) one obtains with D(S) =  ￿89  vS2: 
(r +6)  [  ~  [  B'(Y)  /  ---- ya(K)Y/&  (8.9) 
a(K)  ] 
Substitution of (8.8) into (8.9) yields with B(I  0  =  flY-- ￿89  y2: 
(r+tS)O(fltoN_rKi)  2  l--2w  =  r)'aoKl  (8.10) 
The left-hand side (LHS) and right-hand  side (RHS) of (8.10) are portrayed 
in Figure  3.  One sees that  an increase in the efficiency of clean technology, 
w'  >  to, gives rises to an increase in the stock of clean technology, that is 
OK/Oto  >  0.  7  Whether  consumption  and  output  increase  or  diminish 
depends  on  the  elasticity  of the  emission-output  ratio  with  respect  to  the 
stock of clean technology, to. If the elasticity to is large, then the first term in 
OC/Oto  =  --(rK/Nto 2) +  (r/toN)(OK/Oto)  may be outweighed by the second 
term and consequently an improvement in the efficiency of clean technology 
boosts consumption  and  production.  This  is  presumably the  mechanism  to 
which  the  optimists  in  the  environmental  debate  refer  to.  However, if this 
elasticity  is  very  small,  an  increase  in  efficiency  is  likely  to  reduce  con- 
sumption  and  production.  This  is  presumably the mechanism  to which  the 
pessimists in the environmental debate refer to. 
If to ---- ￿89 then (8.10) shows that 
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and thus that 
I< 
Fig. 3.  Higher efficiency of the stock of clean technology. 
Also, one can easily demonstrate that 
Oto  (r +  6)6 
+  log(K~)l  >  0 
evaluated  at  to  -- ￿89 because at an optimum K x >  1  (else  a(Kl)  >  a o and 
one would  be better off without  investing in  clean technology). This means 
that when the elasticity of the emission-output ratio with respect to the stock 
of clean  technology is large, one ends  up  being an optimist in the  environ- 
mental debate. However, it is also easy to show that as to  -*  0  one has (0 Cl/ 
0to)  --'  -oo,  even though  (OKl/Oto)  >  0,  so that for low values  of  to  one 
ends  up  being  a  pessimist.  In fact, with  the  aid  of the  mean-value theorem 
one  can  estabilish  an  U-shaped  relationship  between  private  consumption 
and  output  levels on the one hand  and  the  elasticity of the emission-output 
ratio  with  respect  to  the  stock  of  clean  technology  on  the  other  hand. 
The  point,  where  the  U-shaped  curve  cuts  the  vertical  axis,  of  course, 
corresponds  to  the  equilibrium  without  investment  in  clean  technology,  as 
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Fig. 4.  Optimists  and pessimists  in the environmental debate. 
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8.2. INTERNATIONAL  STALEMATES IN POLLUTION CONTROL 
In  the  absence  of  international  policy  coordination,  the  open-loop  Nash 
outcome yields (8.4), (8.5), (8.6) and, instead of (8.7), 
[r + O(N J) -- ( r  =  D'(S).  (8.11) 
Hence, the marginal social damage taken account of by each of the countries 
is  N  times  less  as  under  international  policy  coordination  because  the 
adverse effects of more pollution on other countries are not internalised. The 
equivalent long-run  relationship  to (8.10) for non-cooperative policy making 
is given by: 
(r +  6)6N(flwN-  rKN) _  ,1.~o.~. N2/.71  --2aJ.  (8.12) 




(r -~- ~c}N  >  K, 
2rya~  2  ) 
YM == fl  >  YN ---- ~  --  N=(r +  6)6  >  Y~" 
This  is  perhaps  a  somewhat counter-intuitive  result,  but arises  because the 
marginal  benefit of consumption  and  production  should  equal the marginal 
benefit  to  the  environment  of  an  additional  unit  of  investment  in  clean 
technology (cf.,  expression (8.9)). Hence, absence of international  coordina- 
tion of pollution control leads to too high levels of production and consump- 134  F. van der Ploeg and A. J. de Zeeuw 
tion but also to too excessive levels of stocks of clean technology. Figure 5 
suggests that this result is fairly general. It is crucial to know what happens to 
the  concentration  level  of  pollutants.  Competitive  decision  making  can 
increase or decrease this level depending on whether the increase in produc- 
tion or the increase in clean technology dominates. In the former case one 
believes  that  absence  of international policy coordination causes  primarily 
increases in production, consumption and pollution and rather less increases 
in  clean  technology, so  one belongs  in  the  camp  of the  pessimists.  In  the 
latter  case one believes  that there is  enough scope  for clean technology to 
counter-act  the  adverse  effects  of  production  on  pollution,  so  that  one 
belongs in the camp of the optimists. For the special case w  -~ ￿89 it is easy to 
show that  international coordination of pollution  control  leads  to  a  lower 
concentration level of pollutants (St  <  SN), giving in this case some support 
to the pessimists. Hence, if to =  ￿89 international coordination leads to lower 
levels of production, consumption, clean technology and pollutants. 
RHS 
K 
Fig. 5.  International  coordination of investment  in clean technology. 
9.  Concluding Remarks 
It has been established that when the market is left to its own devices there 
will be too much production and too much pollution, because effectively no 
price is charged for the right to damage the environment. When individual 
governments do charge a  price by levying emission charges, production and 
pollution fall and the environment improves. When individual governments 
coordinate the setting of emission charges, these charges will be higher and 
lead to  even lower levels of production and  pollution. As  far  as  the non- 
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or feedback Nash equilibrium rather than the open-loop Nash equilibrium, 
because  otherwise the optimal emission charges will  be  overestimated and 
the levels of production and pollution will be too low. The point is that the 
feedback  Nash  equilibrium  is  the  appropriate  equilibrium  to  use  from  a 
theoretical point of view, and that it leads  in the absence  of international 
policy cooperation to lower emission charges and more pollution than the 
open-loop  Nash  equilibrium. When one  allows for efforts to  clean up  the 
environment, one finds that less of this occurs in the subgame-perfect, non- 
cooperative outcome than in the open-loop, non-cooperative outcome and a 
fortiori  less  than in the cooperative outcome. When one allows for invest- 
ment in clean technology and efforts to arrest the degradation of the environ- 
ment, it is possible that the adverse effects of excessive levels of production 
on the environment which occur when there is no international coordination 
of pollution  control  are  outweighed by  the  beneficial effects  of excessive 
levels of investment in clean technology on the environment. In that case, one 
may side with the optimists rather than the pessimists in the environmental 
debate. 
Future research will be concerned with the environmental aspects of the 
Ramsey problem (e.g., Blanchard and Fischer, 1989,  Chapter 2) and allows 
one to investigate in what way environmental considerations lead the econ- 
omy away from the golden rule. Although much work in this area has already 
been  done  (e.g.,  Keeler  et  al.,  1971),  not  much has  been  done within an 
international context. It is also of interest to analyse the effects of population 
growth, because this has a beneficial effect on economic growth but a detri- 
mental effect on  the environment. Future research will also  be  concerned 
with multi-country models of environmental control with an  explicit treat- 
ment of two sectors, one production sector and one abatement sector (cf., 
Siebert, 1987; Musu, 1989). 
Appendix: More Pollution at Home than Abroad 
This  Appendix  shows  that  when  it  is  assumed  that  production  at  home 
pollutes the environment more at home than abroad, the steady-state results 
do  not  change.  Hence,  the  model  in  Section  3  is  extended  to  allow  for 
separate pollution levels in each country, Si, i =  1  ....  , N. It is assumed that 
a fraction ar of the emission remains at home, whereas the rest of the emis- 
sion spreads out to the other countries, hence (3.1) becomes 
(  )(')  (1  -  :r)a  ~.  Yj  -  5S,, 
+   7-i 
S,(O) =  S,o,  i---- 1,..., N.  (3.1') 
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Si)/N,  one obtains (3.1) by adding up. The welfare function of government i 
is now given by 
IV, -  I~ exp(--rt) [B(Y,(t)) -  D(S,(t)) l dt.  (3.2') 
It is clear from considerations  of symmetry that the steady-state results will 
not change.  A  more formal  analysis  of the  open-loop case yields for each 
country shadow prices for the pollution levels of the other countries. These 
shadow prices  tend  to zero in the long  run.  A  more formal analysis of the 
feedback case requires value functions of the form  V,(S,,  t)  =  %,  -  aliSi  - 
￿89  2, for country i,  i -- 1,...,  N, which do not depend on Sj, j  #  i. From 
there the steps in Section 6 are unaltered. Hence, allowing for more pollution 
at home than abroad does not change the steady-state results. 
However,  a  much  more  interesting  issue  to  look  at  is  asymmetries  in 
emissions.  The  problem  of "down-stream"  pollution is,  of course, a  classic 
one. For example, the pollution associated with industrial  production in the 
Ruhr area of West Germany (country 2) is dumped in the Rhine and poses 
serious environmental problems down-stream in the Netherlands (country 1). 
Another  example  is  the  burning  of  fossil  fuel  in  factories  in  the  United 
Kingdom (country 2), which causes acid rain and destroys forests in Scandin- 
avia (country  1). In the model such asymmetries are best captured,  for the 
case N  ---- 2, by allowing the fraction of the emission to remain at home to be 
smaller for country 2  than for country  1,  zq  >  n2. The extreme case is, of 
course, that all the pollution of country 2 ends up in country 1, say zq  --  1, 
z~  2 ---- 0, which yields 
s, =  a(Y   +  Y2) -  as1,  Sl(0) =  sl0  (3.r) 
and S  2 =  0. In a non-cooperative equilibrium outcome the up-stream country 
always chooses a level of output corresponding to the market outcome,  112 -- 
YM(-- fl), because its government does not bother to levy emission charges. 
The  down-stream country simply has to accept the resulting damage to the 
environment. The government of country 1 will levy higher emission charges, 
but still  ends up with more pollution than would be the case when the up- 
stream  country did  not produce. To  be precise,  the  concentration  level of 
pollutants and the emission charge of the down-stream country satisfy: 
SIN"= a[r  YM] -- r  S~N(O)= Slo 
ilN ~  (r +  6)rlN -- D'(S1N). 
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pollution level are double what they would be when there is no rubbish from 
up-stream: 
(  2aflv  )ct2)  '  -ro(r + 6)  ZlN( t:x~ )  =  7"-~7-z  ,  "g2N ---- 0  and 
( 
S1N(~176 =  /  " 
6+ 
\r+6 
Now consider  a  benevolent  planner  who  chooses  the  optimal  emission 
charges  in  both  the  up-stream  and  the  down-stream  country  to  maximise 
global welfare.  Apart  from  the  usual  conditions,  the planner  takes  care  to 
equalise the marginal benefit of production in each of the two countries and 
to  set  them  equal  to  the  marginal  loss in  welfare of an  additional  unit  of 
production, B'(Y1) =  B'(Y2) =  a a:,. The development of the optimal concen- 
tration level of pollutants down-stream and the cooperative emission charge 
satisfy: 
S1,-~" 2a#(a'lJI)  -- 6Sll,  $11(0)  =  $10 
r  =  (r  +  6)7:, -- D'(S~,). 
For the quadratic specification, one obtains 
(  )  ~N =  o  <  ~(~)  =  2a~,  +  6(r  +  6)  <  ~,N(~)  and 
2aft  ) 
S,,(oo) =  I  ,  <  S,N(  oo). 
(z2y  [  I  6+2 
\r+6] 
Hence,  the  benevolent  planner  levies  the  same  emission  charge  on  both 
countries, the up-stream country is obviously worse off and the down-stream 
country,  whose producers  now face a  lower emission  charge,  is  better off. 
The welfare gain of the down-stream country exceeds the welfare loss of the 
up-stream country. The down-stream country must make side-payments, and 
finds it optimal to do, in order to induce the up-stream government to levy 
the right amount of emission charges (e.g., Miller, 1989b). 138  F. van der Ploeg and A. J. de Zeeuw 
Notes 
1 Most of the previous  literature  on international  aspects  of environmental problems  (e.g., 
M~ler,  1989a,  b; van Ierland,  1990;  Krutilla,  1990;  Hoel,  1990a,  1991)  does  not consider 
explicitly the dynamics of the concentration level of pollutants  and  does not use the frame- 
work of differential games.  However, other work does seem explicitly concerned with such 
dynamic issues  as well (Hoel,  1990b).  Important  recent  work on the dynamic games asso- 
ciated with the tragedy of the commons may be found in Dutta and Sundaram (1989)  and in 
Benhabib and Radner (1989). 
2  For  an  overview of models with optimal capital accumulation  and  pollution control,  see 
Tahvonen  and  Kuluuvainen  (1990)  and  van  der  Ploeg  and  Withagen  (1991).  The  classic 
reference is Keeler, Spence and Zeckhauser (1971). 
3  The model in this section is based on Chapter 8 of Dasgupta (1982) and extends it to allow 
for multiple countries. 
4  Within the context of the optimal harvesting of a  common renewable resource one often 
finds that the prevailing use of open-loop information concepts seriously underestimates  the 
environmental damage. With iso-elastic demand and zero extraction costs, the open-loop Nash 
equilibrium  leads  to  Pareto  efficient harvesting  rates  whilst  the  feedback  Nash  or  perfect 
equilibrium leads  to  too rapid  extinction of the renewable resource (van der Ploeg,  1987). 
Section 6  also finds that the open-loop Nash equilibrium underestimates  the damage caused 
by pollution and leads to too low emission charges. 
5  From  equation  (4.1)  it  follows  that  the  function  4(')  is  given by  ~(x)  ~  fl  -  x.  The 
expressions for S1(oo  ) and SN(oo) then follow from the steady states of equations (4.3)--(4.4) 
and equations (5.1)--(5.2), respectively. 
6  The optimist-pessimist debate is also highly relevant in the context of environmental policy 
for the Single European Market (e.g., Folmer and Howe, 1991 .) 
7  Mathematically, one has 
OK  [ (r + 8)SflN + 2ryaZoK1-2~ log(K) ] 
=  i;  +  >  o. 
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